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Does competency matter after Charters?
by Michael L. Perlin

The en banc review
While Charters I was like contemporary state cases
involving civilly committed patients (such as the New
York Court of Appeals's Rivers v. Katz decision), it
was clearly a far cry from most of the decisions that
dealt with individuals committed pursuant to the filing
of criminal charges. Had the panel decision stood,
there is no question that it would have altered significantly the body of law applying to this universe of patients. Thus, when the fourth circuit granted en banc
review, it was reasonable to draw the inference that it
was not simply to affirm-in toto-the panel's truly
groundbreaking decision.
It did just the opposite: it vacated the panel decision and remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings in accordance with its opinion,
holding that the district court had correctly determined
that Charters's interests were adequately protected by
the exercise of the professional judgment of Butner's
medical staff at the time of the decision to medicate,
leaving virtually nothing of the panel's original reasoning or holding. I will briefly set out the reasoning that
the majority employed in coming to its decision and attempt to unearth some of the "hidden agendas" that I
think I can discern in it.
Basically, the en banc opinion in ChartersII suggests that the panel was wrong about almost every-

thing. While it agreed that Charters did possess a
constitutionally-retained interest in freedom from bodily restraint (and that this interest was implicated by
the forcible administration of psychotropic drugs), and
that this interest is protected "against arbitrary and
capricious actions by government officials," it recast
the issue in dispute:
[W]hat procedural protection is constitutionally required to protect the interest in freedom from bodily
intrusion that is retained by an involuntarily-committed
individual after a prior due process proceeding that significantly curtails his basic liberty interest[?]

It rationalized the shift in focus this way: since Charters came "legally into the custody of the United
States," the current limitations on his liberty interest
were constitutionally acceptable, and his retained
freedom-from-bodily-intrusion interest must thus "yield
to the legitimate incidents of his institutionalization."
Before it embarked upon its own analysis, the en
banc court stopped to critique the language of the
panel that had cited the potentially "mind-altering"
quality of drug treatment, noting that this phrase was
rife with "all the images that evoke the use by totalitarian states of 'mind-controlling' psychiatric techniques specifically to curtail individual liberty." In a
footnote it pointed out that tardive dyskinesia is the
principal side-effect that "may" be threatened and that
its pathology, its probability, its susceptability to treatment and its durability "probably cannot be more
pessimistically and vividly described than [by] the
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on the Supreme Court's decisions in Youngberg v.
Romeo and Parham v. JR. to reach the conclusion that
committing "the base-line governmental decision to
medicate [to] the appropriate medical personnel of the
custodial institution"-subject to judicial review for
"arbitrariness" -comported fully with due process,
even where the exercise of professional judgment
"necessarily involves some interpretation of the
disputable 'meaning' of clinical 'facts.' "
While conceding that both Parham and Youngberg
involved "somewhat different types of medical decisions," the court concluded that "their general approval of the basic regime proposed by the government here is plain." It drew particular support from
the Court's analysis in Parham that, "while medical
and psychiatric diagnosis obviously was fallible, there
was no reason to suppose that it was more so than
would be the comparable diagnosis of a judge or hearing officer," in concluding that such a regime may
comport with procedural due process requirements
"notwithstanding the absence of any adversarial adjudicative element."
On the other hand, the court rejected Charters's
proposal for several reasons. First, that proposed
regime would bring with it "all the cumbersomeness,
expense and delay incident to judicial proceedings."
Under such a scheme the role of institutional medical
personnel would be transformed into that of "expert
witnesses defending their opinions in judicial proceedings rather than that of base-line decision makers [at
which, piresumably, their opinions... would be entitled
to no greater deference than the conflicting opinions of
the outside expert witnesses whose testimony surely can
be anticipated."
By way of support for this proposition the court
recounted several unreported cases in which Butner inmates, in the wake of the initial panel decision in
Charters, withdrew earlier consent to medication (a
withdrawal supported by outside expert testimony); in
each of these, "[clonfronted with directly conflicting
opinion by two professionally qualified experts," the
district court found the inmates competent to refuse
medication, thus "according less rather than more
deference to the decisions of institutional professionals
than to the conflicting opinions of outside expert
witnesses." On this point the en banc court sympathetically recounted Dr. Johnson's testimony questioning the validity of "any factual inquiry into the
competency of schizophrenic patients to make such
decisions at particular points in time." [Dr. Johnson,
Director of Forensic Services and Clinical Research at
Butner, was the only expert witness in the case.]
Such a scheme-apparently reflective of a "greater
confidence in the ability of judges and adversarial adjudicative processes than in the capacity of medical
professionals subject to judicial review"-flew "directly in the face" of Supreme Court teachings, the court
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concluded, noting that decisions of this type by institutional personnel should be treated by courts as "presumptively valid," and quoting extensively from
former Chief Justice Burger's well-traveled language in
Parham:
Common human experience and scholarly opinions
suggest that the supposed protections of an adversary
proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical
decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental
and emotional illness may well be more illusory than
real.
Therefore, to require a preliminary factual determination of a patient's competency as to medical decision making would pose "an unavoidable risk of completely anomalous, perhaps flatly inconsistent, determinations of mental competence by different judicial
tribunals." Stressing that Charters had already been
declared incompetent to proceed to trial-a "solemn
judicial adjudication [that] still stands"-and conceding
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that "there may be a difference" between competency
to stand trial and competency to engage in medical
decision making, such a distinction, the court concluded "must certainly be one of such subtlety and complexity as to tax perception by the most skilled medical or psychiatric professionals."
On the specific issue of side-effects, while the
court acknowledged that they "introduce[d] an element
in the risk of error that require[d] special concern," it
chose to recast the question in terms of whether this
risk was "so unique" that it required "skewing the
basically approved regime for insuring due process in
making medical decisions," and concluded that it did
not.
Side-effects were simply "one element" in the
"best interests" calculus, and the fact that responsible
professionals expressed "wide disagreement... as to
the degree of their severity, their susceptibility to
treatment, their duration, and... their probability over
the run of cases"-a disagreement reflected in this
case through the dramatically-contrasting amicus briefs
of the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological Association-emphasized to the
court that the side-effects question was "simply and
unavoidably" an element of the "best interests" decision. Stressing that "no scientific opinion is advanced
that these side-effects are so highly probable, so
severe, and so unmanageable that the antipsychotic
medication simply should never be administered...
even with patient consent," the court concluded that
the side-effects threat "can better be assessed and
reviewed within the government's proposed regime
than by an adversarial adjudicative process."
Similarly the court dismissed Charters's claim that
his competency must be determined by a neutral factfinder, as it was not convinced that giving this determination to "non-specialist judges... offers a better
protection against error than would leaving it to responsible medical professionals." The patient's competence..to make an informed judgment-like the
potential for side-effects-was "simply another factor
in the ultimate medical decision."
Turning to the government's stake, the court
stressed that its role "here is not that of punitive
custodian of a fully competent inmate, but benign
custodian of one legally committed to it for medical care
and treatment." [emphasis added] To accept Charters's
proposed regime "would effectively stymie the government's ability to proceed with the treatment-certainly
for an interval that might make it no longer efficacious, and probably indefinitely."
Having concluded that the government's planned
regime was constitutionally adequate, the court then
moved to the issue of how it should be administered.
Relying once again on the Parham case for the proposition that an "internal adversarial hearing" was
similarly not required, it held that "an acceptable professional decision" may be based upon "accepted medical practices in diagnosis, treatment and prognosis,

with the aid of such technical tools and consultative
techniques as are appropriate in the profession," including, inter alia, "the patient's general history and
present condition, the specific need for medication, its
possible side-effects, any previous reaction to the same
or comparable medication, the prognosis, the duration
of any previous medication, etc.," all of which must be
supported by "adequate documentation."

Side-effects were simply "one
element" in the "best interests"

calculus.

The "professional judgment standard," the court
underscored, was not whether the treatment decision
was "the medically correct or most appropriate one,"
but "only whether the decision was made by an appropriate professional." Under this test, there will be a
denial of due process only-quoting Youngberg againwhere the decision is such a "substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible
actually did not base the decision on such a judgment." Thus, there will be only one question to be
asked of experts in any proceeding stemming from a
medication question decision: "was this decision reached
by a process so completely out of professional bounds as to
make it explicable only as an arbitrary, nonprofessional
one." [emphasis added] Such a standard, the court concluded, "appropriately defers to the necessarily subjective aspects of the decisional process of institutional
medical professionals," according them "the presumption of validity due them."
In looking at the facts of the case before it, the en
banc court found that the district court conducted its
"careful inquiry" properly, noting:
Significantly, no evidence was offered that the
decision lay completely beyond the bounds of tolerable
professional judgment. This undoubtedly reflects the
fact that no such evidence was available.
On this point, the court cited two recent scholarly
medical articles [including Baldessari and Lipton, Risks
of antipsychotic drugs overemphasized. 305 NEJM 588
(1982)] that had concluded that antipsychotic drugs
were the "cornerstone" and the "primary modality" in
the management of acute mental illnesses. Finally, in
setting out the limits of its ordered remand, the court
concluded by "assuming that medical professionals,
now aware of the standard to which they are held, may
be as willing to proceed without prior judicial approval
as are other governmental officials such as those on
Continued on page 21

